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Abstract 
In this work we theoretically disentangle the effects of pension provisions on a variety of 
financial incentives to retirement, trying to reconcile them with some key Spanish retirement 
patterns. We find that the “average” individual, who is never affected by any cap of contributions 
or benefits, has weak incentives to retire early and strong incentives to retire at the normal 
retirement age. Alternatively, individuals at the bottom of the wage distribution have strong 
incentives to retire as early as possible, because ot the interaction between age-related penalties 
and the minimun pension. Both findings perfectly accommodate the retirement hazard of medium 
and low earners respectively. In contrast, high earners (those that have their contributions capped) 
despite having strong incentives to retire at the Early Retirement Age, do not do so. This is 
because, for those workers, financial incentives are not a good proxy for the marginal utility from 
working. Finally, we analyze the reasons behind the failure of the 1997 reform in improving the 
sustainability of the Spanish public pension system.  
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 Introduction
Social Security systems in developed countries nowadays are faced with two greatly documented
processes that clearly threaten their nancial sustainability the aging of the population and
the tendency towards early retirement In the present work this second point is analyzed in
particular the links between early retirement behavior and the institutions or details that compose
a particular pension system There are two reasons for this interest First early retirement has a
very important impact on Social Security burden and its prospects of achieving a stable nancial
equilibrium

Second the decisions to enter and exit the labor market aect the dynamics of
productivity and hence employment This is the case because lowering retirement age eliminates
great amounts of human capital and reduces the incentives for its accumulation
The analysis of the eect of public regulations on retirement decisions has been addressed in the
literature on various levels such us the study of implicit incentives for example Gruber and Wise
	
 or Blondal and Scarpetta 	 reducedform models of retirement such us Samwick 	 models
of conditional consumer decisions in a given economic environment Stock and Wise 	 or Rust
	 and dynamic general equilibrium models where the agents interact in a public legislation
framework for example

Imrohoroglu et al 	 For the Spanish case it is worth mentioning
some work on reducedform models of retirement such as AlbaRamrez 	 or Dynamic General
Equilibrium models Rojas 	 Arjona 	 or Conesa and Garriga 	 and nally evaluation of
implicit incentives such as Boldrin et al 	
In line with 	
 and 	 we dissect the eects of the key ingredients of a pension system on
nancial incentives to retire

This type of analysis exhibits several comparative advantages over
more orthodox behavioral models such as computational simplicity capacity to reproduce legal
characteristics with a degree of detail that cannot be achieved otherwise and a very easy application
to policy analysis Furthermore in JimenezMartn and Sanchez 	 it is shown that for many
workers nancial incentives reasonably approximate the optimal retirement rule from a life cycle
consumptionleisure model

In more detail we analyze the nancial incentives to keep working or retire in a sequence of
pension frameworks We start o with a pension system characterized by a benet formula a scal
system and a contribution rule On top of this system we add one by one age and contribution
history penalties tax allowances and nally contribution and benet caps In such context the
properties of incentive measures are analyzed from a diversity of angles age prole as in 	
 the
real wage level and the wage real rate of growth To check the implications of the analysis we
construct simulated cases using the parameters detailed in the appendix A that characterized the

 Spanish pension system
We nd that the interaction between age penalties and the minimum pension causes strong
incentives to retire for low earners Alternatively average earners have no incentives to retire
at the early retirement age since they are unaected by the minimum pension Both ndings
practically mimic the observed retirement patterns for the low and the average Spanish earners

Proposals to reform Social Security legislation see Kalisch and Aman  for a summary of reform processes
across OECD countries that eventually aim at substantial cuts in future commitments have been based on the
nancial di	culties foreseen for PAYG systems
 In Spain as noted by Herce and AlonsoMesseguer  an important
scal imbalance in the public pension system from  onwards is expected


The earliest example of incentive indicators can be found in Lazear 
 For the rst time the remuneration
received by an aged worker is considered to be not only his nominal wage but also the changes produced in his rights
to a company pension by his decision to keep working


There is a notable exception the case of high earners whose contributions and benets are capped
 For them
nancial incentives and the marginal utility derived from work can dier substantially


However in the case of high earners whose contributions and benets are both capped nancial
incentives fail to replicate the empirical retirement hazard at  This is so because for these
workers the change in Social Security Wealth relative to the wage and the marginal utility from
work dier substantially Finally other elements of the system such as the scal system or the
contribution caps are for a majority of workers denitively less important
What are the facts to explain in the Spanish case In the top row of gure  we present the


 retirement hazard rates by age and gender for contribution groups  and 

 For men
in contribution groups  the hazard peak at  is the only very important one Alternatively
for men in contribution groups  both the peak at  and  the rst year at which benets
become available are evident

In the second and fourth rows of Figure  we present hazard rates
for individuals aged  and  by the percentile of the expected wage at age  Low earners most
likely aected by benets oors exit at  in a much higher fraction than medium or high earners
The evidence is less clear for women aged  for two reasons their careers are much more erratic
and many of them do not have the right to retire early Finally hazard at age  is regardless of
the gender important at all considered wage levels
In our analysis of the recent 

 Spanish pension reform we nd that it fails to diminish both
the previous incentives to retirement and the Social Security liabilities Still it produces some
redistribution from above average pensions to below average pensions because of the dierent
shape of the wage prole for those groups of workers We show that there are several marginal
modications of that reform that can reduce both early retirement incentives and the liabilities of
the system Finally we explore two reform proposals aimed at motivating people to keep working
beyond the normal retirement age and nd that for a moderate premium the retention eect is of
little importance
The structure of the rest of the document is as follows In section  we describe the public
framework win which the analysis is undertaken Section  reviews the incentive s measuring
instruments The theoretical results are described in section  In section  we describe the
Spanish Social Security system and analyze a recent reform bill and some other reform proposals
Finally section  summarizes our ndings
 The conguration of a PAYG public pension system
The individual decision to retire is aected by several public provisions Acquiring consciousness
of this variety is interesting in the sense that it reveals the existence of more tools for intervention
than those considered in many quantitative studies of the pensions system reform In short we
mention
 The formula for benets and the scal and contribution rules
 The eligibility criteria and the penalty for insu!cient contributions
 The possibility of early retirement and its penalization

Contribution groups  and  can be assimilated respectively to individuals with highmedium and medium
low incomes
 The expected average monthly income at  years for men women is 
 
 pesetas
and 
 
 pesetas for groups  and  respectively
 The data comes from register data from working
histories see Boldrin et al
  for a description of the source

For women whose sample size is much smaller the patterns are somewhat erratic
 In fact only the peak at 
is very important peaks at latter ages are caused by the small number of observations at that ages
 Alternatively
the peak at age  is either less evident or nonexistent
 As noted by Boldrin et al
  the main cause of that fact
is that an important fraction of women are ineligible for early retirement benets


 Contribution caps minimum and maximum level of contributions
 Minimum"maximum pensions and their family considerations
 Survival pensions and other tokens of generosity
The combination of some or all of these elements congures a particular PAYG system In
our work we articulate the revision of the pension system in two blocs  Norms that aect all
individuals the benet formula the scal and contribution rules P and the age and contribution
history penalization schemes P  Norms that specically aect individuals with extreme levels
of income and"or benets tax allowances P maximum and minimum contributions P and
benets P
 Benchmark pension framework P
The benchmark framework introduces the minimal elements that dene a pension system in a
stationary environment A formula for computing the retirement benet as the average income
from a certain number of previous wages updated for ination P a progressive tax system
P and a Social contributions system P characterized by a constant payroll tax rate c that
nances the pension system
The Public Sector awards a retirement benet P  to any individual older than 
m
 The payment
or benet base is computed as the average of the last R annualized pensionable incomes BC
j
for
j # f        Rg which for the moment coincide with real labor income before taxes W 
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
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
are updated for ination I

 Once P  is computed its value remains
constant
The individual pays taxes for her labor and"or pension income following a progressive tax
scheme where tax rates grow linearly according to taxable earnings Under this scheme the net real
labor income w is given by
w

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
 	
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where C # cW denotes social contributions and 
w
will be called the wage tax wedge In a similar
fashion for pensions we obtain p # 
p
w
	
  
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P  Note that both tax ratios 
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
apart from tax parameters depend on both the wage growth rate  and its initial level w
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 

 c # 
p

w
or pension tax generosity will be useful when studying the eects
of scal progressivity on incentives
 Penalization schemes for early retirement and for insucient contributions
P
When determining the initial benet penalization schemes are commonly imposed on individuals
who retire before a normal retirement age 
N
 the rst age at which full benets are available
or having an insu!cient number of contributions We consider the following age AP  and
contribution history HP n penalization schemes
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

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

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where 
M
is the rst age at which benets became available and n represents the number of
years of contribution at age   Thus in economy P the initial real retirement benet is given by
P  # AP  HP n BR
$
R  
 Tax	free allowances P
 minmax contributions P and pensions P
We introduce these provisions in three steps First in P we consider taxfree allowances on labor
and pension income W
A
and B
A
 respectively Second in P we assume a minimum level of
mandatory contributions C
A
anchored in the calendar year A that replaces wage earnings in
case they lie underneath this minimum and varies according to a constant real rate of growth 
Similarly we assume that there exists a maximum level of contributions
$
C
A
which evolves with
time according to a constant rate $ Finally in P we consider a unique minimum pension scheme
that substitutes the pension when it falls below that minimum Its evolution over time is entirely
characterized through a starting level P
A
and a constant rate of growth  namely the generosity
of the system The scheme for the maximum pension works in a completely parallel way described
by respectively
$
P
A
and $
 Incentives measurement instruments
Incentive s measures are conditional on the following set of assumptions
A Individual perspective only the income that can be personally enjoyed is considered
A Labor income and pensions are respectively the only source of income while active and retired
A There is a positive conditional probability of dying at any age in f     F  g At age F
such probability is one
A The individual does not expect future changes in public regulations
Denition of incentives
Under such conditions we dene the following incentive s measures for immediate retirement of
an individual aged  years old 	
	
     T 
Replacement rate rr Expected net real benet in case of retirement at age  divided by w
at  
rr # E

	pw



Horizon h Social Security wealth SSW  % h  Current period  expectation of the dis
counted present value of net benets accumulated from retirement at  % h until F
SSW  % h  # E


X
F
jh

j
jjp
j
 % h
X
h
j

j
jjC
j

where  #  % r denotes the time discount factor which is related to a xed interest rate r and
ij denotes the probability of being alive at i conditional on survival until age  
Horizon  accrual acr Value of postponing retirement one period from  


acr # SSW  %   SSW  
Implicit tax tax Value of postponing retirement expressed as a fraction of the future ex
pected wage tax # acrw

 Simulation design and base case characteristics
We set up a longitudinal experiment that consists in placing a base case individual in a simple
economic and institutional environment and computing her tax as she ages between f
	
     Tg
At age 
A
her age prole is anchored to a calendar year that is the reference for the institutional
parameters detailed in appendix A and real quantities This context will be useful both for
dissecting the eects of the various pension rules and for exploring the eects of recent reforms of
the Spanish PAYG system
One of the essential traits of the set of public regulations is that individuals that dier in
age labor history occupation contribution regime participation and wage history and family or
personal characteristics survival are treated dierently In the next section we study a base case
in which some of those characteristics are either xed or parametrized as follows
 Only member of an individual family with a constant mortality hazard  independent of age
 An initial nominal wage w
	
 and contribution history of n
	
 years at 
	

 Continuous working history from 
	
to   which implies that n %  # n % 
 A constant rate of growth  of the nominal wage which implies that w

#  % w

 Incentive analysis
In this section we obtain simplied expressions of the incentive measures that will eventually help
explain their dependence on the key ingredients of the pension system Let us start with a decom
position of the social security wealth in case of immediate retirement
SSW   #
X
F
j

j
 
j
p # p
X
F
j
d
j
# pAT  F  
where    # d p is the initial pension and AT  F  is from the perspective of age   the
Benets Accumulator from  to F   The Benet Accumulator depends on life horizon and

Coile and Gruber  have recently proposed the use of a generalized version of the accrual namely the peak
value


future discounting In case the individual considers postponing retirement by one year he would
obtain
SSW  %   # p % AT  %  F   cW


Denoting by  # &pp the growth rate of real benets then the Social Security accrual
in case retirement is postponed one year is
acr # pAT  %  F   cW


from this expression for ages   
M
 a simple formula for the unit horizon tax incentive is
immediate
tax # rr AT  %  F  %K 

where K is a function of labor and income tax parameters In case retirement at ages  
	
	
     
M
  where benets cannot be received is considered by following similar arguments
we nd that
tax # rrAT 
M
 F  %K 
These formula are valid regardless whether the individual exhibits a constant  or a variable
real wage rate of growth The key results with a wage process exhibiting a constant growth rate
are presented next The results under a more realistic quadratic wage process are commented in
section 
 Incentive analysis when the real rate of growth of wages  is constant
 Benchmark pension system 	P

We review the incentive eects on P benet formula P % P scal system and P %
P contribution system
A Benet computation formula P


In the context of P the nominal benet equals the benet base Furthermore when  is constant
the benet base is a xed fraction of the current real wage Hence the replacement rate rr
		
 is
given by
rr
		
#

R

 % 
R

R
 
 % 
R

R
%
 % 

R
 
 % 
R

As shown in the rst row of Figure  two elements aect retirement incentives The rst one
is the fact of having reached the age at which benets are rst available The exit incentives
are always lower when the actual age is below that age because waiting an extra year does not
reduce the period in which benets are received The second is the individual s wage prole shape
parameter  which is inversely related to the tax  tax   In such context it is easy
to proof that there exists a trigger rate  # AT  %  F  slightly increasing with age above
which there are incentives to continuing work This is because the only thing that could increase
the individual s Social Security wealth is a wage increase large enough so as to increase the benet
base in such a way that osets the benets foregone during the additional year of work It should
be clear that this can happen only if  is positive and su!ciently large

A third element also merits our consideration Recalling that d #    it is interesting
to note that since signftaxdg # signfg the higher lower the individual discounts the
future ie mortality risk the lower higher her incentives to continuing work when      
B Progressive Fiscal System P

Under the progressive scal system described in section  both the replacement rate rr and the
rate of growth of the net real benet  are functions of the individual s age wage level and wage
prole
rr
	
# rr
		
 w
	
  
	
 

 c    % 
p

p

where 
p

p
 which captures the eect of the progressivity of the system smoothes out the
inuence of the wage prole on the change in the benet from postponing retirement by one period
Under such circumstances the threshold of existence of incentives to continuing work $ 
 
is higher the tax curve slightly attens and the evolution of the tax curve is marginally
altered although the pattern remains essentially at nally since the signftaxw
	
w
	
g #
signfg the richer the individual the higher the tax when  
  So strikingly richer individuals
are more strongly expelled when the tax is positive or more weakly retained when the tax is
negative However the degree of progressivity that would be necessary to make these alterations
quantitatively important seems to be empirically irrelevant
C Social contributions P

The eect of the contributions is twofold On one hand since K # c  c in equation 
 is
positive Social Security wealth obtained when retirement is postponed for one period is reduced by
the amount of contributions paid during the extra year of work On the other hand a given acr
represents now a larger fraction of wages net of contributions Formally the replacement rate takes
now the value rr
	
# rr
		
  c exacerbating the incentives encountered in P Therefore for
individuals with tax 
  in P both eects unite to increase incentives to exit Alternatively when
tax   both processes go in opposite directions and the former result changes for  su!ciently
large
D Summary of incentive eect in P

Thus in the context of P the taxw
	
  is almost constant before the rst age of entitlement to a
pension it increases notoriously at that age and remains practically constant therefrom However
those individuals with steeper wage proles ie greater  are pushed towards retirement with
greater strength Both patterns are created by the benet formula P and do not signicantly
vary when scal progressivity P or contribution payments P are considered
Given these results in the next section we start analyzing the incentive eects of both penal
ization schemes P are analyzed on the top of P We follow reviewing taxfree allowances P
min"max contributions P and pensions P on the top of both P and P % P This
last step aims at dierentiating the incentives aecting an 'extreme individual subject to trunca
tions from those aecting a 'normal or 'average individual The key results from the analysis are
summarized in Table 

 Age and contribution history penalization schemes 	P
In the context of P two eects appear that are important for retirement incentives First of all
there is an obvious reduction in the replacement rate that becomes rr
P
# AP HP n rr
		

Second the increase in benet due to postponing retirement one year grows because penalization
are strictly decreasing in age Reecting this fact  changes to 
P
#  %  %  
 
		
 where
 which always is greater than zero is a function  # 	   n 
 
We detect three important consequences of the change in  First the threshold for incentives
to continuing work falls Typically becomes negative at early ages Second as illustrated in the left
central panel of Figure  the shape of the tax age prole changes abruptly At ages f
	
     
M
g
the tax falls at age 
M
a decreasing discontinuity appears that contrasts with what was observed
in P top left panel of Figure  nally at ages f
M
%      
N
g the tax increases with age until

N
where a sudden jump of the tax is observed Notice that there another possible jump of smaller
magnitude at the end of history penalties

Third the importance of the wage prole on the tax
is softened
Regarding the eect of the contribution history in the context of P intuition would suggest
that individuals with incomplete histories must have less incentives to retire than people with the
same  w
	
  but complete histories due to the fact that they have a higher  than them A more
detailed study throws down a more ambiguous result On one hand there is an abrupt increase in
the incentive when history penalties end at the contribution period n
M
 On the other hand while
they are active the incentive can increase or decrease with n
	
 depending on age and wage prole
Grossly summarizing we could say that individuals with incomplete history in most cases have
more incentives to keep working than their analogous with complete histories while age turns out
to be a key variable when comparing between individuals with incomplete histories At early ages
the tax decreases with n
	
 except for highly decreasing proles a pattern that progressively
inverts itself as the individual ages
Simultaneous consideration of P and P see the central panels of Figure  and Table  shows
average workers incentives  the age penalization scheme creates a clear retention incentive
at age 
M
 increasing exit incentives in the age range 	
M
%      
N
  followed by an abrupt
jump when 
N
is reached  for a xed age  moderately inuences the sign and level in absolute
value of the incentive  before 
M
the tax is positive for individuals with a moderately decreasing
salary   

 For the rest of the people the pension formula discourages early retirement nally
 the wage level is almost irrelevant
What is the likely the retirement pattern compatible with such incentives An increasing with
age exit rate with a pronounced peak at age  Early retirement at  would be chosen by a
minority only individuals with a very decreasing prole Amid people of the same age exit rates
would be decreasing in the wage prole and at in the wage level
 Wage and benet tax allowances 	P
While retirement incentives of average individuals are unaected by tax allowances that of
low earners as illustrated in the bottom row of Figure  can be either reduced because of the
substitution of the net wage by the gross wage or disrupted by small jumps at the points separating
the regions where tax allowances are enabled or disabled In either case the eects are of small
importance

Decreasing tax proles are possible at ages f
M
      
N
 g for individuals with increasing wages


Taxfree allowances on retirement benets are by far much more important On one hand
both rr and  increase generating a step in the ageprole of the incentive and reinforcing the eect
of the scal system On the other hand very intense punctual incentives to work are created at the
age where the taxfree allowance activates when    and very intense punctual incentives to
exit are created at the age the taxfree allowances are deactivated when  
  These incentives
appear as sudden discontinuities in the pattern of incentives according to age The relevance of
such discontinuities diminish when generalized incentive s measures such as the horizon h tax are
considered
In most cases both age or history penalization schemes increase the range of individuals spe
cially those characterized by    that are aected by tax allowances on pensions When the
individual ages and consequently penalties are less severe the benet taxfree allowance can be no
longer binding and incentives to stop working may appear see the left bottom corner of Figure 
for an illustration
 The eect of oors and ceilings on contributions and benets 	P and P
As a rule ceilings and oors on contributions and pensions reduce the dependence of the incentive
on personal characteristics This is so because when the thresholds are fully binding the accrual
becomes constant regardless the labor income level and"or prole However this general equalizing
eect sharply varies with the particular threshold
Ceilings Maximum contribution and pension 	P and P
The ceiling on contributions becomes fully operative when all wages that enter in the formula for
the benet base are above the legislated maximum In such case  can be expressed as
acr # C

 p

% p

AT  %  F  
where p

is the real pension when B # BC

 and  is its rate of change When the ceilings
on pensions are immediately binding after retirement the accrual is given by
acr # C

 p


Both  and  reect an accrual that is essentially independent of the individual labor
income process Notice that when both penalties are not binding  #  and thus both  and
 fully coincide The implication for the tax is clear the larger the wage the closer the tax is
to zero There is however a remarkable dierence between the eects of both truncations the
maximum benet cancels out the eect of age penalties whereas the maximum contribution does
not The latter fact greatly dampens the eect of the maximum contribution For this reason the
eect of the maximum benet is as a rule much more important
Figure  makes the entire story apparent  For extreme wage processes either a very high
initial wage level central column or real rate of growth of the wage right column both regulations
make the tax go to zero  Maximum pensions turn the typically negative sign of the tax in
the early retirement ages into a positive one This makes the tax in practice at for  
 
m


In
contrast the maximum contribution barely modies the tax at those ages  The simultaneous
consideration of both thresholds bottom row of Figure  clearly shows that the quantitative eect
of maximum pensions is predominant

Before 
m
the opportunity cost do not include the lost pension irrespective of how it is computed



Floors minimum contribution and pension 	P
 and P

The eect of oors the minimum contribution and minimum pension is similar to that of ceilings
the analytical expressions are completely analogous and the accrual becomes essentially at when
the oors are fully binding As a result the absolute value of the tax becomes arbitrarily large as
lower values of w
	
or  are considered see the right and central panels of gure 
Some specic observations are however in order  The existence of a minimum wage regula
tion reduces the eects of oors specially in the case of the minimum contribution which usually
is related to the minimum wage  Very low salaries are typically associated to a positive tax at
the rst age of entitlement to benets see the central top panel of gure  for an illustration
Furthermore the minimum pension blocks the incentive eects of both age and history penaliza
tion schemes This creates a selective expulsion eect before the normal retirement age on low
income workers which  in accordance with for instance Spanish empirical patterns is stronger
the lower the salary considered Notice that this case is the one empirically relevant for the long
term unemployed whose unemployment benets fall with the unemployment spell
 When considering both oors simultaneously as in the bottom panels of gure  the
eect of the minimum benet largely dominates that of the minimum contribution at the ages

m
 
m
%  
m
%  However as the individual approaches 
N
the eect of minimum contribution
gains weight  It is not the minimum pension by itself what increases the retirement incentives
but the interaction with age penalties Notice that in the simulated case the tax at ages above

N
where the penalties play no role is reduced by the benets oor This can be explained by
considering the analytical expression of the accrual when the threshold is not immediately binding
acr # C

 p % p AT  J
where J is the minimum pension rst binding age In absence of penalties individuals with  
have    and in consequence a negative accrual positive tax  When the threshold is binding
the negative third term is reduced as a result of AT  J  AT  F  The constraint accrual is
then less negative and the expulsion eect is undoubtedly reduced

Summing up we have reported how the oors and ceilings on benets block the incentive
eects created by age and contribution penalties fostering early retirement behavior Note that
this distortion will be more important as time passes because two reasons First the legislated
ceiling typically grows at a lower rate than wages A good example can be found in countries
where earnings ceilings are priceindexed eg Sweden
	
In Spain the increasing incidence of the
contributions ceiling has been documented in Boldrin et al 	 Secondly as the wage dispersion
increases the oor on benets may also remain binding for a signicant part of the labor force
 Monetary incentives under a concave wage prole
In order to explore the inuence of the wage prole in the results obtained we have simulated
incentive proles with a quadratic wage process in which the curvature is parameterized through
( the incremental rate between ages 
	
and 
N

w

# w
	
	
 % ( 
  
	

N
 
	





	
When the threshold is binding at age  acr   C

 P

so as the nal eect on the incentive is unclear the
negative eect derived from the fact that   is removed but at the same time the opportunity cost of the lost
pension grows



This fact has been taken into account in the recent reformulation of the Swedish pension system see Scherman
 page 
 In the new public pension scheme the pensionable earnings ceiling is indexed to wages


As commented at the beginning of section  expressions 
 and  are still valid in this context
Thus most of the eects found in the linear case remain unaltered The most noticeable dierences
which arise through a more active role of the benet formula are summarized as follows
 The incentive increases strongly with age The reason is twofold rst because of wages fall
faster than benets which implies an increasing replacement rate second because of the
increase in  AT  %  F  derived from the accelerated fall in 
 The importance of the prole ( on the sign and the level of the incentive is lower The
consideration of age penalties accentuates this eect until the pattern of the tax is left nearly
at at (
 An application to the Spanish Social Security reform analysis
In this section we rst describe the Spanish Social Security General Regime RGSS Second we
check whether the empirical retirement patterns of workers enrolled the RGSS match the theoretical
incentive proles we have described in the former section Third we evaluate the implications of
the 

 reform in terms of retirement incentives of that reform Finally a few reform proposals
aimed to motivate workers to stay in the labor market beyond  are discussed
 Spanish Pensions System RGSS
Next we shall describe before and after the 

 reform the rules governing the RGSS that currently
covers over  percent of the total number of a!liates to the Spanish Social Security System
 Financing and eligibility of the RGSS
The RGSS is a social protection system nanced by the a!liates salary contributions The con
tributions are a xed share of the pensionable earnings a doubly censored version of earnings
Both the censoring from below minimum level of contributions and from above maximum vary
according to professional category Presently eleven categories or contribution groups can be dis
tinguished For the rst seven groups that range from Engineers and College degree holders to
Administrative Auxiliaries minimum and maximum are computed for monthly salaries For the
remaining categories minimum and maximum are computed on a daily basis The current rate of
contribution is  percent of which  percent is due by the company and the remaining 
percent by the worker
In order to have the right to a retirement pension a minimum of  years of contributions is
required two of which must lie in a period of ten years immediately before retirement
 Benet computation
Consider a  year old person who fullls the eligibility criteria who retires in month t after having
contributed n 
  years His rst theoretical monthly benet under the system in place from 

to 

 can be expressed as P

t
# HP

nB

t
 where the benet base B

t
is a weighted average
of the monthly pensionable wage or base of contribution BC
tj
for which he has contributed to
Social Security during the 
 months eight years that came immediately before retirement
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where I
tj
is the Consumer Price Index for the month j before retirement Thus earnings in
the last two years before retirement are not adjusted for ination For earlier months they are
adjusted and converted to money equivalents of the th month before retirement The benet
base is divided by  because pensions and usually salaries are paid in  monthly installments
whereas Social Security contributions are levied on  installments The penalty for insu!cient
contribution HP

 depends on the number of yeas of contribution and is equal to
HP

n #



 if n  
 %  n  if   n  
 if   n
Thus after contributing for  years the benet already is equivalent to  percent of the benet
base After contributing for  years the benet equals the benet base and there is no additional
advantage in contributing more years although contributions to Social Security are mandatory until
retirement
 Early retirement
The normal retirement age is  but early retirement as from age  is permitted with a penalty
of  percent per year anticipated on  provided that the individual started contributing to the
Social Security system before 

It should be stressed there are no clear incentives to postpone retirement beyond  especially
for those who have already contributed for  years when they reach  The only indirect incentive
to postpone retirement comes from the possible substitution of a bad wage period for a good
one For those who have contributed for less than  years there exists a small direct incentive
derived from the increase in the history penalty Note that the incentive to work an extra year is
dierent for two individuals of ages  and  having contributed  years each In the rst case
the benet increases from  to  percent of the benet base while in the second case it only
increases from 
 to  percent
 Maximum and minimum benet and indexation rules
Benets are subject to a maximum that is legislated every year For example in 

 the maximum
was 
 million pta"year corresponding to approximately  times the minimum wage and 
times the mean wage for industry and services
If the computed retirement benet falls below the applicable minimumbenet  ptas"year
in 

 for people over  in charge of a spouse and summing other incomes the individual does
not earn more than a certain annual amount  ptas in 

 as a general rule and 

when there is a dependent spouse he receives a complement up to the minimum benet of his
class or alternatively up to the annual threshold marking the limit to the right to complements
Until 
 benets were indexed to real wage growth )From them they are indexed only
to expected ination measured by the Consumer Price Index CPI However due to periodical
tokens of generosity minimum pensions are linked to real wage growth in practice
 Hazard patterns of workers under the RGSS
In this section we construct a few representative empirical hazard using information from a sample
of working histories from the Spanish RGSS in 



to check to what extend theoretical incentive

See Boldrin et al
  for a description of the source

proles are able to match empirical retirement hazards In doing so we control for the following
heterogeneity dimension gender age contribution group and expected wage level at age  In
the top row of gure  we present the 

 retirement hazard rates by age and gender for contri
bution groups  and  Contribution groups  and  can be assimilated respectively to
individuals with highmedium and mediumlow incomes

For men in contribution groups  the hazard peak at  is the only very important one
Alternatively for men in contribution groups  both the peak at  and  the rst year at
which benets become available are evident For women third row of that gure whose sample size
is much smaller the patterns are somewhat erratic In fact only the peak at  is very important
peaks at latter ages are caused by the small number of observations at that ages Alternatively
the peak at age  is either less evident or nonexistent As noted by Boldrin et al 	 this is
likely to be caused because of the fact that an important fraction of women are ineligible for early
retirement benets
In the second and fourth rows of Figure  we present hazard rates for individuals aged  and
 by the percentile of the expected wage at age  For men aged  regardless the group of
contribution the gure is almost identical to the central top panels of Figure  Low earners most
likely aected by benets oors exit at  in a much higher fraction than medium or high earners
The evidence is less clear for women aged  for two reasons their careers are much more erratic
and many of them do not have the right to retire early Finally hazard at age  is regardless of
the gender important at all considered wage levels
 The  reform
The 

 reform introduced three changes i The number of reference years in the formula starts
to increase by one every year from eight up to fteen to be reached by  ii The penalty for
insu!cient contribution changes in the following way
HP

n #







 if n  
 %  n  if   n  
 %  n  if   n  
 if   n
iii The early retirement penalty is reduced from  percent to  percent for those who have
contributed for more than  years by the time of retiring Note that this change provides an extra
incentive of  percent for those who have contributed more than  years when they reach  years
old
It should be clear that i reduces the benet base for those workers whose real pensionable
earnings grow continuously with age and increases it for those who see them reduced during the last
years of their labor life ii reduces the theoretical benet for those workers who have contributed
for less than  years thereby increasing their probability of being trapped by the minimum benet
nally iii increases the replacement rate of those who retire between  and  years old and
reach within this period  years of contribution while leaving the rest of individuals unaected
JimenezMartn and Sanchez 	 show that only i is quantitatively important Analyzing the
RGSS sample they nd that between ages  and  the contribution bases between are decreasing
for workers in groups  and nondecreasing for workers in groups  Consequently taking
into account the dierence in the wage levels of these two groups i may lead to a redistribution

The expected average monthly income at  years for men women is 
 
 pesetas and 


 pesetas for groups  and  respectively


from high earners to low earners pensions In contrast they show that measures ii and iii only
aect particular groups of individuals For example measure ii is of little importance for men
since only  percent of males have contributed for less than  years when they turn  The
situation for women is just the opposite since most of them have contributed for less than  years

 percent of those in groups  However the real incidence of that reform as described in
	 is of limited importance since many women do not have the right to retire early Finally the
impact of measure iii is of little importance since in neither case the fraction of those that have
accumulated  years of contributions when they turn  is greater than  percent
In Table  we explore the eects of the reform on the implicit Social Security debt First of all
the impact depends on the shape parameter of the wage prole For increasing proles  
 the
reform always reduces the implicit debt while for decreasing ones the debt augments for a broad
range of wage levels Second the reform is especially benecial for individuals with  years of
contribution by age  Alternatively for those who only have  years of contribution by age 
the reform is only benecial from age  depending on the value of  In summary the reform
fails to lower the Social Security debt in many quantitatively important cases
 Analysis of the  reform
In this section we evaluate the reform on the light of the stylized model presented in section 
 Evaluation of contribution history reforms
We consider the eects of modications in the contribution history penalties for individuals with
average income not aected by wage level thresholds The analysis to economy P % P where
the key qualitative results are evident Recall that in this economy the expression of the incentive
is given by
tax # rr
		
AP HP  AT  %   F  
Let us consider a new penalization scheme that while leaving unchanged the thresholds n
m
 n
M

modies the amount of the penalties to new values 

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implying that HP

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The change in the incentive is driven by the simultaneous alteration of rr and  It is straight
forward to show that the replacement rate falls
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The alteration of  #  %  %  operates through the change in  which in turn depends
on the relative change in the two parameters of the lter
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Despite the simplicity of the partial eect on the replacement rate and the parameter  the
joint eect requires more elaboration in most cases tax

 tax so the reform is to reduce the
incentives to retire for workers with a positive tax and to increase the incentives to work for people
with a negative one However this eect weakens when a individual with higher  are considered
In fact for extremely positive wage proles the reform may reduce the incentives to keep working
In order to be more precise we turn to the comparison of the incentives faced by a base case
individual under three alternative contribution history schemes before the 

 reform base or

 system after that reform namely theConcave Reform and under the following alternative
scheme namely a Convex HP reform

Convex HP reform HP n #








 if n  
 % n   if   n  
 % n   if   n  
 otherwise
The left and central top panels of Figure  present the tax at age  by level of  under the
three schemes of the HP for individuals with  and  years of contribution respectively The
Concave reform does not introduce signicant changes in the incentives faced by the individuals
with a history n  f g with respect to the previous 
 scheme whereas the Convex
reform introduces a clear retention eect inversely related to the value of  For individuals with
sorter histories n  f g the result depends on the wage prole
For the concave reform the threshold 

is positive thereby retaining all individuals that are
characterized by a decreasing wage prole that is the less skilled Alternatively under the convex
reform the threshold 

is typically negative and quite large in absolute value which implies that
the exit incentives increase for all the individuals characterized by   

 However for male
workers the latter case is practically irrelevant due to the small fraction less than  percent of
male workers that have accumulated less than  years of contributions at age  The situation
is radically dierent for women since a majority of them have accumulated less than  years of
contributions at age 
To conclude this section let us now review how the Social Security debt towards an archetypal
individual average wage and softly decreasing prole as a function of retirement age varies with
the alternative contribution history schemes see the left top panel of Figure  Given that both
reforms increase penalties with respect to those existing before the 

 reform it is clear that
both suppose a relief for the Social Security s burden In any case it becomes clear looking at the
gure that the convex reform would suppose considerably superior savings especially if workers
were to respond to the higher permanence incentives by postponing their retirement age
 Reform of the age penalization
We now compare the eect on the incentives of the 

 reform and an alternative reform with
respect to the age penalization scheme applicable before 

 The rst one was described in 
and the alternative reform follows next
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For both reforms the penalization is lower than in the initial situation so that AP


 AP which
implies that rr


 rr What is really dierent between both reforms is the range of ages for which
they imply a bigger reduction of the AP The 

 reform reduces the AP a  percent by age 
four by age  and so on whereas the alternative AP reform gives percent at  to percent at age
 and so on As for  we nd a condition that is analogous to the one found in 
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Both reforms have opposite consequences for  while the 

 reform reduces it the alternative
reform increases it The simulation results presented in the left and central bottom panels of Figure
 are in this case su!ciently clear while the 

 favors early retirement the alternative AP reform
retains the individuals Since the dierential eect of these two measures is higher at early ages
it is interesting to stress see the right bottom panel of Figure  that it is precisely at these ages

where the nancial cost of the alternative reform for the Social Security is lower than the cost of
the 

 reform In any case if individuals were to respond favorably to the retention incentives
the most feasible situation would be that the system be forced to face higher costs in the case of
the new reform as the retirement age increases Only if retirement were to be postponed until 
would the additional cost of the new reform be zero
 Increasing the number of years of contributions used to compute the benet
base
In this section we study the eect of the extension the number of years of contribution that enter
in the formula of the benet base R to a higher value R  as is proposed in the 
 reform At rst
glance it is easy to show that the new replacement rate in P rr

 is greater lower than the
initial one only for decreasing increasing wage proles Since AT  % F  does not change
this reform cannot change the sign of the tax for any individual It only strengthen its level at
the early retirement age where the penalties lead to a negative threshold $ usually lower than
the steepness of the prole of the archetypal worker the reform increases the incentive to keep
working alternatively at an age near 
N
the threshold $ is positive and the reform reinforces the
incentive to retire
 Introducing incentives to postpone retirement beyond 
As in many economies in Spain pension rules are actuarially unfair in case of delaying retirement
beyond  Recent reform proposals to be applied by  or  aim to extend active live by
partially eliminating this discrimination In this section we analyze two of the various possibilities
that can help to motivate workers to keep working after   Eliminating mandatory workers
contributions "th of Social contributions in the Spanish case for % workers Notice that this
reform increases the net wage and reduces the replacement rate and  Permitting the AP to be
greater than one after age  thereby increasing the benet after age 
 Eliminating mandatory contributions for  workers in P

Consider the case of the average worker in the age range   
N
#  and subject to pension
system P Under the proposed modication of mandatory contributions after age  the new tax
is given by
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
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It is straightforward to show that 

w

   c
w
 which implies that tax

 tax so that the
reform decreases the incentives for all ages above 
N
 Notice that for this reform the progressivity
of the income tax is crucial to generate any retention eect However the retention does not seems
to be enough to oset the ascending step that the tax shows at age 
N


 Increasing the replacement ratio for workers  in P

  P
The proposed reform introduces a small alteration of the penalty formula  after age  repre
sented as follows
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is the premium to keep working after age  Under such circumstances we nd that
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
 tax   if
the following inequality holds
AP 
 AT  %  F 
 AT  %  F 


So given the fact that  
  the premium cannot be extremely generous to motivate workers
to keep working Despite so for a premium equal to the Spanish age penalty ie 	

# and
a real rate of interest of  percent the inequality holds with roominess at all ages between  and

 Conclusions
In this work we analyze the eect of pension provisions and scal norms on the individual nancial
horizon one incentives to retirement We show how this type of theoretical analysis can greatly
enhance our understanding of empirical retirement patterns in Spain In particular we identify the
precise economic mechanism by which Social Security forces early retirement of lowwage workers
Our rst contribution is empirical we nonparametrically estimate the retirement hazard as
a function of the expected at age  wage level at the key ages for the Public Pension System
the Normal Retirement Age 
N
and the Early Retirement Age 
m
 We nd a remarkably clear
negative relation at the age of  
m
in the Spanish System while no dened pattern emerges
at  
N
 This new evidence complements the well known nding of abrupt spikes in retirement
hazards at both ages
We next show how both patterns can be rationalized as the optimal response to the incentives
created by scal and social security regulations To achieve this we compute the theoretical analogs
of the empirical ndings above the life cycle prole of retirement incentives faced by agents of
dierent wage levels and the wage level prole of retirement incentives faced by agents at dierent
ages
The life cycle incentives experienced by the average worker strongly change with age as a result
of the interaction between the pension formula and early retirement penalties First individuals
have mild incentives to retire before the rst age at which benets are rst available because the
pension is unavailable before 
m
 Second two forces pull in dierent directions after 
m
 the
opportunity cost of the pension lost and the imposition of early retirement penalties Particularly
in the Spanish case this second eect creates a very strong incentive to keep working until 
N

Finally after 
N
the impact of the penalties disappears the opportunity cost is at its maximum
and the average wage dynamics which operate through the pension formula tend to reduce future

pensions All these forces together produce a sharp reduction in the incentives to keep working and
provide a convincing explanation for the huge spike in retirement hazard at the normal retirement
age
Life cycle incentives are very dierent for workers on both tails of the earnings distribution as
they become subject to the oors and ceilings on pensions and contributions Minimum pension is
the most powerful device By blocking the eect of early retirement penalties it creates a strong
incentive to retire at 
m
on low income workers This can account for the age  spike on the
hazard by age and for the decreasing prole on the hazard by wage at 
It is important to note the critical role that age penalties play in this result All the caps and
ceilings of the system particularly minimum pensions have the additional eect of isolating the
benet dynamics form the labor income dynamics Given the fact that earnings tend to decrease
at advanced ages this isolation eect has the unexpected impact of reducing the incentive to retire
stemming from decreasing wage dynamics This means that all thresholds have an expulsion eect
in the age range f
m
     
N
g when the age penalties guarantee that postponing retirement results
in a larger benet and a retention eect after 
N
 It is also interesting to note that the expulsion
eect is lower for workers on the upper tail of the income distribution This is so because both the
maximum pension and the maximum contribution reduce the size of the benet which increases
the opportunity cost of leaving the labor force A nal aspect that deserves careful consideration
is the process of annual updating on the legislated values of the oors and ceilings If they fail to
keep pace with wage increases as in recent years the incidence of the truncations on retirement
behavior is due to increase
Regarding the evaluation of the 

 pension reform we have not found any substantial change
in the retirement incentives particularly on individuals who had shown a strong tendency towards
early retirement in the past Its most noticeable eects are a slight reduction in the implicit tax
suered by individuals with incomplete contribution histories on one hand and a failure to lower
the Social Security debt in many quantitatively important cases on the other Still it produces
some redistribution from above average pensions to below average pensions because of the dierent
shape of the wage prole for those groups of workers We propose some small modications in the
design of the age and contributions penalties which would achieve a simultaneous reduction in the
retirement incentives for those previously cited groups and in the expected Social Security debt
Finally on regard the evaluation of some recent reform proposals aimed at diminishing the
actuarial unfairness of the Social Security formula after age  we nd that for a moderate premium
the retention eect is of little importance

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Appendix
A Calibration of the theoretical economy for the Spanish case
We replicate the 

 institutional framework a few years before the 

 reform The anchor age

A
is  years old and the simulation period f
	
     Tg is f     g The discount factor d is

 and the institutional parameters take the following values
Penalties Fiscal system and cont thresholds
age history c  from below from above
	
	
 
	
 
	
 C
A

$
C
A

	

 

 

   $ 

M
 n
m
 W
A
 P
A


$
P
A


N
 n
M
 B
A
   $ 

Most of them are directly taken from the values in force in the anchor year Others however
need some interpretation The contribution rate c is the one that is applied to the worker for all
concepts As for the contribution minimum we select C
A
the value in force for group of contribution
 In order to parameterize its time evolution we took the average real growth rate between 

and 

 For the contribution maximum we proceeded in a similar fashion with respect to the
base level
$
C
A
 Calibrating $ is a more delicate matter due to the eort that has been put into the
homogenization between categories for this variable The result is that from the beginning of the
nineties categories  have a common contribution maximum This was achieved by increasing
somewhat abruptly the contribution maximums of categories  to  while the rst s maximum
followed a smooth pattern of real value loss This last pattern less business cycle related and
more fundamental is the one that we wanted to include in the model so we selected the average
growth value starting from the moment when the maximum of the represented category reached
the maximum of category  that is in 

 As for minimum benets we reected the values for
single men under  Finally for the scal system we tted by Least Squares the relation between
contributory basis and payments that surges from equation  a quadratic polynomial without a
constant term

B Notation
Income process
W
j
 w
j
 Before and After tax real labor income
w

 Real wage level at age 

    Nominal and real wage growth rate wage prole
  Curvature parameter of a quadratic model of wages dynamics
Contributions
C
j
 c  Contributions paid at age j and payroll tax rate
HP
s
n  Contribution History penalty under system s	

n  Length of contributory record
n
m
 Minimum number of years to be eligible for a pension
n
M
 Number of years required to achieve full pension rights


 

 parameters of the history penalty lter
C
t
 C
t
 Legal oor  ceilings contributions
C
A
 C
A
 Anchor levels for minimum and maximum contributions
   Legal oor  ceilings growth rates
p

 real pension when all relevant contributions are truncated
  pension growth rate when all contributions are truncated
Fiscal system

w
 
p
 Wage and pension scal ratios earnings
  
p
	
w
 Fiscal pension generosity



 


 Tax system parameters
W
A
 B
A
 Labor income and pension income scal allowances
Pensions
BRR 
s
 Benet base under system s	

BC
j
 Pensionable earnings at age j
I
j
 CPI at age j
P  p
j
  Before and after taxes real pension in case of ret at 
R R  Number of indexed years included in the benet base

m
 
N
 Early and normal retirement ages
AP   Penalty for retirement before 
N


 

 AP  parameters
P
t
 P
t
 Legal oor and ceiling on benets
P
A
 P
A
 Anchor level for minimum benet
P
A
 Anchor level for maximum benet
   Legal oor and ceiling growth rates
Incentive measures


     T   Range of possible retirement ages

A
 Anchor age for calendar time events
rr rr
Pxx
  replacement rate in pension system Pxx at age 
SSW   h   Social Security Wealth in case of retirement at   h
acr tax  accrual and implicit tax at age 
  	  r  market discount factor
F  Maximum length of life
jj   Conditional and conditional constant survival probabilities
d     eective discount factor
AT i F  
P
F
ji
d
j
or benets acumulator
  growth rate of real benets
  marginal wage growth rate for negative tax
  combined penalties lter growth rate
J  rst binding age for benet truncation

Table  Summary of the incentive results in P and P%P
Provision Eect on P Eect on PP
P Fiscal progressivity     Retains Expels 
    Expels 
P Social contributions Expel    Expel
otherwise Retain
P Age and history Retain 
penalties
P labor income reduce the absolute idem
taxfree allowances value of the incentive
P Pension tax    and   
N
 expel idem
taxfree    and  
N
 retain idem
allowances Punctual steps    Retain    Expel idem
P minimum    Retains idem
for    contribution otherwise Expels
P maximum    Retains idem
for    contribution otherwise expels
P Minimum    Retains Expels 
for    benets otherwise Expels 
P Maximum    Retains Expels 
for    benets otherwise Expels 
Notation
 Retain Expels reduces increases tax  Moderates reduces jtaxj in absolute value
 threshold for a sign switch of the tax in each economy

Table  Social Security implicit debt under the 

 system relative to the 
 system

Base case Average wage at age 
Forty years of contribution Thirty years of contributions
age            
		 
	 
 
 
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Base case Single contributing at group  average wage in  and
subject to the rules and parameters of the system described in the Appendix
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Figure  tax in economies P P and P%P for a constant 
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Figure  The eect on tax of contribution and pension ceilings for a constant 
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Figure  The eect on tax of contribution and pension oors for a constant 
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Figure  Exit rates by age and expected wage at age  HLSS"RGSS sample 


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Figure  tax and SSW from alternative reforms of history and age penalties
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